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Discounting and Reciprocity in
an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
D. W. Stephens,* C. M. McLinn, J. R. Stevens
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) is a central paradigm in the study of
animal cooperation. According to the IPD framework, repeated play (repetition)
and reciprocity combine to maintain a cooperative equilibrium. However, ex-
perimental studies with animals suggest that cooperative behavior in IPDs is
unstable, and some have suggested that strong preferences for immediate
benefits (that is, temporal discounting) might explain the fragility of cooper-
ative equilibria. We studied the effects of discounting and strategic reciprocity
on cooperation in captive blue jays. Our results demonstrate an interaction
between discounting and reciprocity. Blue jays show high stable levels of
cooperation in treatments with reduced discounting when their opponent
reciprocates, but their levels of cooperation decline in all other treatment
combinations. This suggests that stable cooperation requires both reduced
discounting and reciprocity, and it offers an explanation of earlier failures to
find cooperation in controlled payoff games.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates the eco-
nomic barriers to cooperative action. In this
game, the defecting (noncooperative) option
is always the best choice for a single play of
the game, even though both players could do
better if they cooperated. Axelrod and Ham-
ilton (1) argued that cooperation could be a
game theoretical equilibrium if (i) the game
was played repeatedly and (ii) the players
adopted a reciprocating strategy. In their ar-
gument, repetition and reciprocity combine to
make mutual cooperation a viable strategy,
because although a defector will receive an
immediate reward, reciprocity means that it
will suffer for this choice in the long run.
Although theoreticians have exploited this
paradigm with great success, it has been mark-
edly less successful empirically (2–5). Nonhu-
man animals show a strong tendency to defect
in experimentally created Prisoner’s Dilemmas
(6–9). These studies raise important questions,
because we cannot usually confirm that the
payoffs in naturalistic studies conform to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. This uncertainty has led to
controversy in some cases (10–12), and in oth-
ers, it has led to questions about whether sim-
pler explanations of observed behavior might
not be more appropriate (5, 13, 14). More than
20 years after Axelrod declared the Prisoner’s
Dilemma to be “the E. coli of social psycholo-
gy” (15), there is still no single unambiguous
case of stable nonhuman cooperation in a ver-
ifiable Prisoner’s Dilemma.
One possible explanation for the fragility of
cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(IPD) is strong temporal discounting. In theory,
animals should cooperate in an IPD because
cooperation leads to higher payoffs in the long
run, but animals may not value these long-term
benefits because they strongly discount the fu-
ture. Psychological studies support this idea. In
these studies (16–18), experimentalists offer
animals a choice between small immediate and
large delayed food rewards. These experiments
show very strong preferences for immediacy.
Fitted discounting functions suggest that the
first second of delay reduces the value of food
reward by as much as 50% (19). These data,
therefore, suggest that animal discounting may
be much stronger than rates typically assumed
by economists and other students of human
behavior [e.g., 4% per year (20)].
An alternative explanation of the fragility
of cooperative equilibria might hold that an-
imals fail to cooperate, not because they dis-
count strongly, but because they do not im-
plement the appropriate strategy. In the IPD
framework, the opponent’s reciprocation
means that cooperation now enhances long-
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Fig. 1. (A) Top view of apparatus. The apparatus consists of side-by-side compartments, each in the
shape of a V. Each compartment is equipped with three perches. Each perch has a microswitch that
reports its status to a controlling computer. Each compartment houses a single bird, one of which
is designated the subject and the other is designated the stooge. The subject chooses freely, but the
stooge follows an experimentally imposed strategy. At the beginning of a play, the birds wait on
their respective rear perches (at the apex of the V). At a programmed time, the controlling
computer switches on stimulus lights on the front panel signaling that a trial has begun. The subject
may hop forward to one of the two front perches to indicate its choice. A hop on the inside perch
indicates a cooperate (or “C”) choice, whereas a hop on the outside perch indicates a defect (or “D”)
choice. The stooge only sees one stimulus light and must hop on the associated perch. The
apparatus is designed with transparent partitions across the front and opaque partitions elsewhere
so that the birds can see each other after they have made a choice (hopped to the front), but not
before. When both birds occupy one of the front perches, the pellet dispensers deliver food into the
accumulators. (B) Accumulator. A transparent plastic box, front and center in each compartment,
received food from the pellet dispenser. The bottom of the box was a flap that could be opened
by the controlling computer. Thus, during accumulated treatments, subjects could see their food
gains but not consume them until the flap was opened.
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term gains by increasing the likelihood of
future cooperation; without such a strategy,
there is no reason to cooperate, even if ani-
mals do not discount strongly.
We conducted a factorial experiment, ma-
nipulating discounting and strategy, to assess
the contributions of discounting and strategic
reciprocity to the fragility of the cooperative
equilibrium. The subjects were 16 blue jays
(Cyanocitta cristata) of unknown sex and
mixed experimental histories. We assigned
these 16 individuals to eight pairs of unrelat-
ed individuals. We designed an experimental
chamber composed of side-by-side V-shaped
compartments so that each member of the
pair had its own compartment (Fig. 1A).
To manipulate discounting, we used pay-
off-accumulation treatments in which sub-
jects had to complete a sequence of plays
before obtaining the accumulated benefits
from that sequence (21). Intuitively, this
should emphasize the combined benefits of a
sequence of interactions. To implement pay-
off accumulation, our apparatus dispensed
food into a transparent box (Fig. 1B) so that
subjects could see their winnings but not
consume them until a flap at the bottom of the
box opened. In accumulated (low discount-
ing) trials, we held food in the accumulator
for four plays of the experimental game, dis-
pensing the subject’s accumulated gains at
the end of the fourth play in a sequence. In
unaccumulated treatments, the flap dispensed
food after every play. A preliminary experi-
ment confirmed that accumulation reduced
discounting as predicted (22).
To manipulate strategies, we randomly
designated one individual in a pair to be the
subject and the other to be the “stooge.”
During data collecting trials, the subject
chose freely between cooperating (C) and
defecting (D) in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (23).
The stooge, however, played one of two ex-
perimental strategies: unilateral defection
(All-D) or tit-for-tat (TFT) (cooperate initial-
ly but copy your opponent’s previous move
on all subsequent plays). The stooge, there-
fore, was forced to choose either C or D,
according to its preprogrammed strategy. In
broad outline, therefore, our experiment was
a conventional two-by-two factorial experi-
ment with two levels of accumulation (accu-
mulated and unaccumulated) and two levels
of opponent strategy (All-D and TFT).
Game theoretical equilibria are stability
concepts, so our design tested the effects of
these four treatments on the stability of co-
operation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. To
achieve this, we presented each subject with a
baseline matrix, which quickly led to high
levels of the C response. After establishing
high levels of C, we switched to a Prisoner’s
Dilemma payoff matrix and measured chang-
es in the frequency of C over 1000 free-
choice trials. The experiment followed a
within-subjects design so that each pair ex-
perienced all four treatments in a randomly
determined order (22).
Results from the four treatments are
shown in Fig. 2 (22). When the opponent
always defected, the frequency of coopera-
tion declined toward zero, regardless of
whether food accumulated. When the oppo-
nent reciprocated, however, we observed
elevated levels of cooperation, but there
was a striking difference between accumu-
lated and unaccumulated treatments. In ac-
cumulated treatments, where in theory we
reduced the effects of discounting, levels of
cooperation are high and stable. In unaccu-
mulated treatments, levels of cooperation
are elevated but declining, parallel to the
pattern shown in the All-D treatments. A
repeated measures analysis of variance
shows a significant accumulation by strat-
egy by time interaction (F2,14  4.31, P 
0.03), supporting the idea that reduced dis-
counting and strategic reciprocity combine
to influence the stability of cooperation.
Fig. 2. Stability of cooperation in each
of our four treatments. The y axis
shows the relative frequency of the C
response. The x axis divides trials into
thirds, roughly the first 333 trials, the
second 333 trials, and the third 333
trials. (A) Data for the accumulated
(reduced discounting) treatments. (B)
Unaccumulated (normal discounting)
treatments. The dashed line shows
treatments in which the opponent
plays the reciprocating strategy TFT,
and the solid line shows treatments in
which the opponent plays All-D. Error
bars indicate 95% confidence levels.
Fig. 3. Stability of cooperation
showing individual variation.
This is similar to Fig. 2, except
that individual subjects are dis-
tinguished as shown in the leg-
end. (A and C) Accumulated (re-
duced discounting) treatments.
(B and D) Unaccumulated (nor-
mal discounting) treatments. In
(A and B), treatments are shown
in which the opponent plays the
reciprocating strategy TFT, and
in (C and D), treatments are
shown in which the opponent
plays All-D.
R E P O R T S
www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 298 13 DECEMBER 2002 2217
 
Data in Fig. 3 are similar to those in Fig. 2,
except that Fig. 3 shows separate results for
each subject. Individuals were most consistent
in the All-D/unaccumulated condition, where
all eight subjects approached zero cooperation
by the end of the treatment. In the TFT/accu-
mulated treatment, there is more variation, but
all individuals were cooperating at elevated lev-
els at the end of the treatment. In the TFT/
unaccumulated condition, we observed some
intriguing bimodality, with three of eight birds
showing stable levels of cooperation (as in the
TFT/accumulated treatment) and the other five
birds showing an erosion of cooperation that
parallels the data in the All-D treatments. The
elevated levels of cooperation observed in the
TFT/unaccumulated treatment (Fig. 2B) are
largely due to these three individuals.
Our data allow some characterizations of
the subjects’ strategies in response to the
experimentally created reciprocity of the
stooge. One can represent a variety of first-
order strategies with the vector representation
(t, r, p, s), where t is the probability of
cooperating after obtaining payoff T [subject
defected, stooge cooperated (23)], r is the
probability of cooperating after obtaining
payoff R (both subject and stooge cooperat-
ed), and so on (21). Using this notation, we
represent TFT as (1, 1, 0, 0), All-D as (0, 0,
0, 0), and Nowak and Sigmund’s (24) Pavlov
as (0, 1, 1, 0). Table 1 shows calculated
strategy vectors for the two treatments in
which the opponent played TFT (25).
We saw three patterns. First, all four com-
ponents of the strategy vector were higher in
the accumulated treatment than in the unac-
cumulated treatment. We observed especially
striking differences between the accumulated
and unaccumulated treatments for the t and p
components of the strategy. This means that
subjects were more likely to switch from
defection to cooperation when payoffs accu-
mulated, regardless of whether their most
recent defection resulted in a large (T) or
mediocre (P) payoff. In contrast, the r and s
components of the strategy varied relatively
little, suggesting that the main effect of accu-
mulation is an increased willingness to switch
from defection to cooperation. Second, the
overall pattern of the observed strategy was
r  t  s  p; that is, subjects were most
likely to cooperate after mutual cooperation
and least likely to cooperate after mutual
defection, but they cooperated at roughly
equivalent intermediate levels in the two
“mixed” situations (t, subject defected and
stooge cooperated; s, subject cooperated and
stooge defected). Third, as Table 1 shows, the
observed strategy disagrees strikingly with
both Pavlov and TFT. For example, both
Pavlov and TFT predict that s  0 (do not
cooperate with a player who has just “suck-
ered” you), but our subjects were extremely
forgiving, cooperating at rates near 50% after
they had been suckered.
Our results show that discounting and strat-
egy both affect the stability of cooperation; we
observed high stable levels of cooperation
when payoff accumulation reduced discounting
and the opponent played the strongly recipro-
cating strategy TFT. We observed declining
levels of cooperation in all other treatments.
Several recent critiques of the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma have focused on discounting (7, 9, 26,
27). Our result is in general agreement with
these critiques, but it also emphasizes the com-
plementary relation between discounting and
strategy. It is, after all, the strategy that creates
a pattern of future gains.
Our work suggests that the timing of ben-
efits can be the difference between stable
cooperation and cooperation that erodes to
mutual defection. These results agree in some
respects with Axelrod and Hamilton’s influ-
ential framework (1), because they show that
reciprocity combines with future value to sta-
bilize cooperative action. Yet, our results also
agree with the work of those who have chal-
lenged the general applicability of the IPD
framework to real animal cooperation, be-
cause the experimental machinations required
to stabilize cooperation in our study are spe-
cial. Specifically, our results disagree with
the field’s traditional focus on simple undis-
counted repetition. In contrast, they provide
solid evidence for the role of discounting and
impulsivity in animal cooperation and there-
fore raise questions about what factors can
reduce discounting enough to promote coop-
eration. Information about when benefits are
realized in cases of natural cooperation may
provide important insights into the organiza-
tion of animal social behavior.
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Table 1. Observed and theoretical strategies. The probability of the subject cooperating in the trial
following the T, R, P, and S payoffs was calculated for accumulated and unaccumulated trials in the TFT
treatment. A bootstrap sampling technique was used to establish confidence limits. This technique
generated 1000 strategy vectors from the data. The values for TFT and Pavlov represent predicted
strategy vectors for subjects implementing those strategies. Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence
limits.
Source t r p s
Data:
Accumulated
0.644 (0.600, 0.683) 0.755 (0.731, 0.780) 0.394 (0.349, 0.437) 0.587 (0.545, 0.628)
Data:
Unaccumulated
0.381 (0.338, 0.425) 0.686 (0.652, 0.720) 0.225 (0.202, 0.248) 0.496 (0.450, 0.542)
Theory:
Tit-for-tat
1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
Theory:
Pavlov
0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0
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Materials and Methods
Here we describe materials and methods of two experiments, as well as present SOM text with
brief results. The first was a preliminary experiment to explore the effects of payoff




The apparatus used in both experiments is shown in Fig. 1A. Each V-shaped compartment was
equipped with one rear perch and two front perches, all connected to microswitches so that the
experimental program could detect which perch a bird occupied. Each perch was positioned
immediately below a stimulus light (Med Associates ENV-123) that could display any of several
colors.
The front panel of each compartment was also equipped with a food cup, an associated
pellet dispenser (dispensing 20-mg pellets, Med Associates ENV-203-20), and a custom-made
small transparent box in which pellets accumulated (Fig. 1B). At experimentally determined
times, a flap on the bottom of this box could be opened (by energizing a solenoid), delivering the
pellets into the food cup. This device allowed us to create accumulated treatments in which food
accumulated, seen but unavailable, over several trials, and unaccumulated treatments in which
food was dispensed immediately at the end of a trial.
Training
Before being tested in an experiment, subjects were trained to wait on the rear perch for a fixed
time and then hop forward to an illuminated front perch to obtain food. This training used
conventional shaping (or successive approximation) techniques and, typically, took 3 to 6 weeks
to complete.
Closed Economy
We ran both experiments as a closed economy: Subjects lived in the apparatus and obtained all
of their food from it. Experimental contingencies were in effect from 0700 until 1100 and from
1200 to 1600 every day. There was a 1-hour break for apparatus maintenance and animal care
from 1100 to 1200 daily; otherwise, the animals stayed in the apparatus.
All stimulus lights were dark during the periods when contingencies were not in effect.
To ensure that subjects obtained sufficient food to survive, we provided supplementary food (at
1600 daily) for any bird that obtained <7 g during the day. A white noise generator provided
masking noise whenever the experimental contingencies were in effect.
Preliminary Experiment
The goal of the preliminary experiment was to determine whether and under what conditions
accumulation and the temporal arrangement of trials influence blue jay preferences for
immediacy (or discounting). This experiment followed the self-control procedure typically used
in discounting studies [see (S1) for an example]. In self-control studies, subjects must choose
between a small immediate benefit and a benefit that is larger but more delayed. Animals with
strong preferences for the small immediate benefit are said to exhibit strong discounting. This
experiment considered the effects of temporal clumping of trials and the accumulation of
benefits across trials.
Subjects
The subjects in the preliminary experiment were six adult blue jays of unknown sex and mixed
experimental histories: Band numbers were b70, b85, b108, b223, b229, and b239.
Overview of a Trial
The sequence of events within a trial was as follows. (i) The subjects waited for a fixed time (the
intertrial interval). (ii) The apparatus offered a choice between small immediate and large
delayed options, by switching on lights of different colors at the front of the apparatus. (iii) The
subject chose one of the options by hopping forward to the associated perch. Once the choice
was made, the unchosen light was switched off, and the experimentally programmed delay to
food began. (iv) When the programmed delay expired, food was dispensed, and the process
began again at step 1.
Trials were organized into blocks of 32. The first 8 trials within each block were forced
(or “no choice”) trials in which the subjects were offered only one option (i.e., either the small
immediate option or the large delayed option, but not both); the remaining 24 trials were free-
choice trials. We randomly selected the light colors associated with small immediate and large
delayed options for each subject, and this association was maintained throughout the experiment.
Treatments
Clumping treatments. Trials were arranged into groups of four (within the blocks of 32 discussed
above). In temporally “clumped” treatments, the subject waited 345 s between clumps and then
was presented with a quick succession of four trials, with a 5-s gap between each trial, so that it
experienced four trials every 360 s. In unclumped trials, the subjected waited 90 s between each
trial, again experiencing four trials every 360 s.
Accumulation treatments. In accumulated treatments, food was held in the accumulator—
visible to the subject, but unavailable—for four trials and was delivered immediately after the
fourth trial was completed. In unaccumulated treatments, the accumulator dispensed food
immediately.
Delay treatments. To assess whether our manipulations influenced the blue jays’
sensitivity to delay, we tested three levels of delay-to-small (one 20-mg food pellet after 5, 15, or
30 s) and two levels of delay-to-large (three 20-mg food pellets after 45 or 75 s). Each subject,
therefore, experienced 24 distinct treatments (two levels of accumulation, two levels of
clumping, two levels of delay-to-large, and three levels of delay-to-small). We first randomized
the order in which each subject experienced the four accumulation/clumping treatments. We then
randomized the order in which they received the six delay treatments within each
accumulation/clumping treatment. Each delay treatment ran for 3 days, yielding ~430 free trials
per treatment.
Baseline treatments. To minimize order effects, we set up the experiment so that the
subjects experienced a baseline treatment before testing in each accumulation/clumping
treatment. We designed the baseline treatment to be intermediate between the actual
experimental treatments. The delay-to-large was 60 s, and the delay-to-small was 25 s. At the
beginning of each set of four trials, the baseline program randomly determined whether the next
four trials would be (i) clumped or not and (ii) accumulated or not. In clumped trials, the subject
waited 285 s before being presented with a succession of four trials, one 5 s after the other. In
unclumped trials, the subject waited 75 s between each of the four trials. Subjects experienced 4
days of these baseline trials before starting each new accumulation/clumping combination.
Brief Results
Repeated measures of analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the arcsine-transformed data found a
significant accumulation/clumping interaction (F1,5 = 9.9683, P = 0.0252), suggesting that
temporal clumping enhanced the effect of accumulation on discounting. Specifically, payoff
accumulation shifted individual jays’ preference toward larger, more delayed options when trials
were clumped in time (univariate test of significance for post hoc comparison, F1,5 = 13.3131, P
= 0.0148).
Main Experiment
The main experiment was designed to study the interaction between strategy and discounting in
an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this experiment, pairs of blue jays repeatedly chose between
two alternatives representing cooperation (C) and defection (D). To manipulate strategies, we
assigned one individual in each pair to act as a stooge. The stooge was trained to simply follow
lights, and in doing so it could be made to follow an experimentally determined strategy [either
tit-for-tat (TFT) or All-D]. We used payoff accumulation to manipulate discounting.
Subjects
The subjects were eight pairs of adult blue jays (16 birds total). In an effort to maintain similar
levels of motivation, we chose birds with similar body weights for each pair. We randomly
designated one member of the pair as the subject and another as the stooge. The pairs in this
experiment (subjects are listed first in each pair) were b22 and b18, b24 and b84, b70 and b1,
b85 and b140, b122 and b3, b223 and b106, b229 and b130, and b239 and b208. In referring to
the pairs, we cite only the subject’s band number.
Overview of a Trial
The sequence of events within a single trial (or play of the game) was as follows. (i) The
computer switched on the rear lights at the beginning of each trial, signaling that a new trial had
started. When both subjects occupied the corresponding rear perches, the rear lights were
“washed out” (by switching on an additional white light) to indicate that beginning of the
intertrial interval. (ii) When the intertrial interval had expired, the subject’s front lights were
switched on, indicating that a choice (or play) had become available. The appropriate front light
(as determined by the programmed strategy) for the stooge was switched on at the same time.
The trial only proceeded to this choice phase if both individuals were on their rear perches. (iii)
Next, both birds hopped forward to one of the front perches, the unchosen light was
extinguished, and the chosen light was washed out as described above. (iv) Once both birds
occupied their front perches, food was dispensed according to experimentally determined game
matrices.
Treatments
Following the results of the preliminary experiment, all trials were arranged into clumps of four
to enhance the effect of accumulation on discounting. The birds waited 345 s and then played
four times in quick succession with 5 s between plays. In addition, trials were arranged in blocks
of 40 (10 clumps of 4), with 8 forced or no-choice trials followed by 32 free-choice trials. During
the forced choice trials, the apparatus presented only one option to the subjects (either C or D),
whereas the stooge continued to play its programmed strategy (TFT or All-D).
The C and D choices were defined by their positions (see Fig. 1A). In addition, we
randomly assigned the color of stimulus light associated with the subject’s C and D for each
treatment. The stooge’s lights were both the same color.
Stooge strategy treatments. As explained above, the stooge implemented a strategy that
we determined (either TFT or All-D). We simply programmed the apparatus so that the
appropriate choice (C or D) was the only one available to the stooge. To program TFT, for
example, we programmed the apparatus to show the inside C light, if the subject cooperated on
the previous trial, and to show the outside D light, if the subject defected on the previous trial.
The appropriate payoff matrix (baseline or PD) determined the subject’s payoffs, just as if the
stooge had chosen freely. When there were long programmed gaps between plays, such as from
one day to the next or over the midday break, the TFT player began by cooperating.
Accumulation treatments. In accumulated treatments, food was held in the transparent
accumulator for a series of four trials, whereas in unaccumulated treatments, the flap was opened
at the end of each trial, immediately dispensing food.
Game matrices used in treatments. In describing payoff matrices, we use the
conventional Prisoner’s Dilemma notation. That is, a focal player obtains R (the reward for
cooperation) if both players cooperate, obtains S (the sucker’s payoff) if the focal player
cooperates and his opponent defects, obtains T (the temptation to cheat) if the focal player
defects and his opponent cooperates, and obtains P (the punishment payoff) if both players
defect.
Game theoretical equilibria are stability concepts. To test the stability of cooperation in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma treatment, we sought to first create high levels of cooperation. To achieve
this, we presented each subject with a baseline matrix (R = 4 pellets, S = 2 pellets, T = 0 pellets,
P = 0 pellets) that quickly led to high levels of the C response. Subjects experienced this baseline
treatment before each Prisoner’s Dilemma test, for a minimum of 3 days, terminating only when
the subject showed 80% C or higher for two consecutive days. All treatment variables
(accumulation, stooge strategy) were in effect during this baseline phase.
During tests, the subject experienced the Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix R = 4 pellets,
S = 0 pellets, T = 6 pellets, P = 2 pellets. The stooge obtained two pellets on all trials. Thus, the
stooge received slightly less food on average than the subject did. We did this to maintain the
stooge’s overall hunger level and to make sure that the stooge was equally motivated to choose
either the C or D alternative.
Summary of general treatment procedures. The general plan of a single treatment was as
follows. (i) Stimulus colors, stooge strategy, and accumulation treatment were randomly
assigned. (ii) The subject experienced the baseline matrix (with the chosen accumulation and
stooge-strategy treatments in effect) until the cooperation criterion was satisfied. (iii) The
subject’s payoff matrix was changed to the PD matrix, and this was in effect until the subject
completed 1000 free-choice trials (5 to 7 days). We repeated this cycle until each subject had
completed all four accumulation/strategy combinations. In one case, a subject completed less
than 1000 free trials (never less than 800 free trials), because of an error in the program that
managed the transitions from one treatment to the next.
Brief Results
A repeated measures ANOVA of arcsine-transformed choice proportions found the following
effects: main effect of time period F2,14 = 59.61, P ≈ 0.0; main effect of opponent strategy F1,7 =
63.72, P = 0.000092; main effect of accumulation F1,7 = 4.20, P = 0.08; two-way interaction of
time period and opponent strategy F2,14 = 25.12, P = 0.000023; two-way interaction of time
period and accumulation F2,14 = 1.28, P = 0.31; two-way interaction of opponent strategy and
accumulation F2,14 = 0.42, P = 0.54; and three-way interaction of time period, opponent strategy,
and accumulation F2,14 = 4.31, P = 0.034.
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